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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON PROCOPIUS’ USE OF NUMBERS
IN DESCRIPTIONS OF COMBAT IN WARS BOOKS 1–7
Conor Whately
Scholars of classical historiography have been interested for some time
in the estimates of numbers in combat used by ancient historians.1 While little
work has been done on such numbers in Procopius,2 Catherine Rubincam has
made a thorough study of casualty figures in Thucydides. She notes, in particu-
lar, that where Thucydides provides an uneven account of casualties in a battle,
it is because of his desire to emphasize the gravity of the losses on one side;3
that while his figures are not as straightforward as they at first seem, he is usu-
ally free of the exaggeration prevalent among other ancient historians;4 that his
employment of exact figures is selective and used only when he wants to focus
on some feature of a particular battle.5 In a more general paper on numbers
in Greek historiography, Rubincam further notes that rounded figures—for ex-
ample, 200, 300, 1,000—suggest that these are little more than estimates made
by participants,6 and that verbal qualifiers such as “more than,” “less than,” and
“about” might be restricted to cases where there were concerns about the num-
bers used, or to emphasize a given figure.7
An examination of a historian’s use of numbers reveals a great deal about
research methods, writing practices, and processes of selection. Given that Pro-
copius is our only source for many of the events he describes8 and that his
numbers are regularly used to illustrate matters such as the size of sixth-century
armies, we must understand fully how he uses them.9 In what follows I propose
discuss whether Procopius’ literary strategies concerning numbers are compara-
ble, especially with regards to precision and consistency, to those employed by
I thank Matt Gibbs, Mark Golden, Michael Whitby, as well as the two anonymous referees and
the editor at Phoenix, for their invaluable feedback.
1 Note, for example, Rubincam 1979; Macve 1985; Hornblower 1994: 26–28; Morpeth 2006.
2 For the Gothic Wars, see Hannestad 1960; Thompson 1982: 77–91; Liebeschuetz 1996.
While Feissel (2002) and Treadgold (2007: 218–221) looked at Procopius’ numbers throughout
his works, including the Wars, the Buildings, and the Secret History, Feissel limited himself to
distances and Treadgold devoted little space to the topic. Much work remains to be done to take
scholarship beyond Treadgold’s (2007: 218) assessment that Procopius’ numbers are “statistics” and
Liebeschuetz’s (1996: 232) assertion that “Procopius’ numbers are incomplete and in part certainly
unreliable.”
3 Rubincam 1991: 187.
4 Rubincam 1991: 190.
5 Rubincam 1991: 190.
6 Missing ref. to "more general paper" here. Cf. Rubincam 1991: 457.
7 Rubincam 2003: 460.
8 I will not discuss whether there is a perceptible difference between the numbers used in those
episodes in which Procopius was present, and those in which he was absent.
9 See, for example, Treadgold 1995: 59–64.
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classical historians. In particular I will be applying Rubincam’s conclusions on
number use among classical historians to Procopius, bearing in mind that Pro-
copius was known to be a careful reader of Thucydides and Herodotus, whose
impact on his writing has long been recognized.10 Although Procopius and the
classical historians operated in different worlds and used different sets of data,
the striking commonalities between the two groups make such an undertaking
worthwhile. I will return to this issue in the final section.
To keep the discussion manageable, this paper will centre on the figures that
Procopius uses in descriptions of combat. In the first half of this paper I discuss
these issues (precision, vagueness, consistency in number presentation) in the
Persian Wars and the Vandal Wars. In the second half, I look at the degree of
precision in Procopius’ use of numbers in the Gothic Wars. Discussion has been
restricted to books 1 through 7, which were published as a unit in 550/551,11
and excludes Book 8, which was published three or four years later (553/554),
as well as the Secret History and the Buildings.12
procopius' background
Before we start with the Persian Wars, however, a few comments on Pro-
copius’ background are required in order to consider the type of information
and numbers to which he would have had access. We know that Procopius was
in a position to get accurate information; Procopius became Belisarius’ assessor
(“secretary”) in 527,13 and campaigned with the Roman army in the east from
527 to 531; Procopius also accompanied Belisarius on his expedition against
the Vandals in 533.14 After returning to Constantinople to celebrate Belisarius’
triumph,15 Procopius headed west again for the war against the Goths in 535.
He remained in Italy for some time, witnessing important military operations,
including the siege of Rome in 537–538 and the siege of Auximum in the sum-
mer and autumn of 539, and he went to Ravenna in May of 540 when the
Roman army entered the city.16 Procopius might have travelled with Belisarius
back to the east, and then back to the west in later years, but we are less certain
about this.17
10 See Braun 1885; Moore 2014: 54–80; and Pazdernik 1997, 2000, and 2015.
11 Rubin 1957: 354; Cameron 1985: 9; Börm 2007: 50–52; Treadgold 2007: 189.
12 Rubin 1957: 354; Greatrex 2003: 55–56; Brodka 2004: 17; Treadgold 2007: 189–190.
Book 8 and the Secret History should probably be discussed as one unit; see Cameron 1985: 34, n. 7,
52. I have excluded Book 8, as well as the Secret History and Buildings, because they are separate
works, or in the case of Book 8 read that way.
13 Procop. Wars 1.12.24. On Procopius’ career as an assessor, see Martindale 1992: 1060–62. Cf.
Rubin 1957: 296–297; Börm 2007: 47; Treadgold 2007: 179.
14 Treadgold (2007: 181) suggests that Procopius was present at the war council in Constantino-
ple that convened in discuss the possible invasion of Africa.
15 Procop. Wars 4.8.3–14; Martindale 1992: 1061; Börm 2007: 47; Treadgold 2007: 181.
16 Procop. Wars 6.4.14; Rubin 1957: 298; Martindale 1992: 1061–62; Börm 2007: 48; Treadgold
2007: 182–183.
17 See Cameron 1985: 188.
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While we know something of Procopius’ background and position, we know
less than we would like to about the record-keeping of the sixth-century military,
especially in relation to the detailed and comparably well-documented record-
keeping of the earlier imperial army, which is illustrated in, for instance, the
papyri collected by Fink.18 Instead we have traces in the rather precise numbers
from other texts for military matters, notably the totals given by John the Lydian
and Agathias, as well as the figures given for unit sizes by Maurice,19 not to
mention the earlier Notitia Dignitatum.20 There is even good reason to think
that Roman troop numbers in the age of Justinian were standardized, as they
had been for centuries,21 which would have made a good part of Procopius’
task—collecting reliable figures—much easier. Procopius might well have been
informed about Roman troop numbers; indeed, it might even have been part of
his job as assessor to keep accurate records of the numbers involved (Procop. Wars
1.12.24), and then compose official reports of the outcomes—and details—of
battles.22
the PERSIAN WARS
I begin with the Persian Wars and its most detailed battle. In the Battle
of Dara, Procopius’ is varied, detailed, and informative: his description is at
places precise, at others vague and incomplete.23 Early on in this battle, he
describes the disposition of the armies and, beginning with the Roman army,
claims that Buzes was placed on the far left with many horsemen along with
Pharas the Herul and 300 fellow countrymen (Procop. Wars 1.13.19); on the
right of those men were Sunicas and Aigan with 600 horsemen (1.13.20); on the
far side there were many horsemen under John, Cyril, Marcellus, and Dorotheus
(1.13.21); and at an angle to those men were 600 horsemen under Simmas and
Ascan (1.13.21). Next, Procopius tells us that “the men with Belisarius and
Hermogenes” stood at the back in the centre, providing us with no hint of the
number of troops arrayed at that position, let alone the types of troops they
were (1.13.22). Having described the deployment of Roman forces, Procopius
then tells us the totals for the two armies: 25,000 troops in the Roman army,
40,000 troops in the Persian army (1.13.23). A skirmish opens the battle and in
the mélée seven Persians fall (1.13.28). We are not told the number of troops
involved, and there is no way of knowing how significant that loss was even if
18 Fink 1971.
19 John Lydus Mens. 1.27; Agathias 5.13.7–8; Maur. Strat. 3.8.
20 Note the comments of Treadgold (1995: 44–49) and Whately (2015).
21 Treadgold 2005; Elton 2007: 284–286.
22 On sixth-century combat reports, see Colvin 2013 and Sinclair 2013: 152–208. Unfortunately,
although we know that the Romans created combat reports, none survive. Malalas (18.6), for
instance, alludes to one such report without providing details.
23 For an overview of the Battle of Dara, see Syvänne 2004: 461–462. For a more detailed
treatment, see Greatrex 1998: 169–185.
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it seems self-evident. All we learn is that “a certain detachment of horsemen
who held the right wing” (t’w t™n ´ppvn, o· kraw t˜ deji˜n eåxon) left the
collected Persian forces and attacked “the men under Buzes and Pharas” (to”w
úmf“ Boœzhn te ka“ F‡ran, 1.13.25). The next part of the battle includes the
two single combats won by Andreas, which brings the first half of the narrative
to a close.
Procopius tells us that on the following day the Persians were bolstered by an
additional 10,000 troops (Wars 1.14.1), but once the main phase of the fighting
on the second day begins we learn that the mihran arrayed only half of the
Persian forces against the Romans, at least at first—they were intended to be
used in rotation (1.14.29). Our next indication of the numbers involved comes
when “many Cadiseni” attack the Roman line opposite them, and kill quite a
few men (suxnoœw, 1.14.38). In response, the “men with Sunicas and Aigan
charge against them at top speed” (o´ jn t! Soun’kÙ te ka“ &A•gˆn, dr—m~
poll™ \p' a[tow ®esan, 1.14.39). In the next line Procopius tells us that the
300 Heruls with Pharas slipped behind the enemy (1.14.39). In this part of the
fighting we learn that “no fewer than 3,000 died in this struggle” (o[x ³ssouw É
trisx’lioi \n toœt~ t! p—n~ úpyanon, 1.14.42). The mihran now sends in the
Immortals, in addition to “many others” (1.14.44). Belisarius and Hermogenes
spot this charge and order “the 600 men under Sunicas and Aigan” to go against
them on the right (tow úmf“ Soun’kan te ka“ &A•gˆn °jakos’ouw, 1.14.44).
In addition, “they positioned at the back many of Belisarius’ men” (ka“ a[t‹n
»pisyen t™n Belisar’~ °pomnvn pollow Ásthsan, 1.14.44). This attack
divides the Persian force in two so that most were on the right, while some
were on the left (1.14.47). By the end of this second phase of the battle, after
the mihran has sent in the Immortals, we get our last figure. We learn that the
Romans killed “around 5,000” (1.14.51).
In sum, what we find with Dara is a mixture of vague and specific figures,
with a particular emphasis on precise Roman troop numbers and precise Persian
casualty figures. In other words, Procopius has given us, in many instances, the
sorts of figures we would expect him to give based on the information to which
we would expect him to have access: more particular figures for Roman troops,
less detailed ones for Persians. The troop totals too seem reasonable, based on
what we know about sixth-century armies in the east; the abundant multiples
of ten do imply the use of rounded estimates.24
Procopius is selective in his use of numbers, not only within specific battles
such as Dara, but also throughout the Persian Wars. Focusing on casualties,
Procopius writes that seven men died in the opening phase of the battle, that
two single combatants died at the hands of Andreas, that no less than 3,000
Persians died in the first of the two main phases of the fighting, and that by the
24 See Treadgold 1995: 74 on Roman army numbers, and Börm 2007: 159–163 on Persian army
numbers.
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end of the fighting with the Immortals the Romans had killed “around 5,000”
(Procop. Wars 1.14.51). He provides no information for Roman casualties. By
contrast, for the Battle of Callinicum, Procopius writes that “they found that
the number of their own dead bodies was no less than that of the enemy’s” (o[
m|n tow sfetrouw nekrow t™n polem’vn \l‡ssouw eûron, 1.18.50), which
tells us the only comparative magnitude of the casualties, and not the number.25
In the Battle of Anglon he tells us that the Persians killed a large number of
Romans with ease (2.25.26). In the Battle of Nisibis, Procopius does give us
the number of some Roman casualties, for we learn that the Persians killed fifty
men and took the standard of Peter (2.18.22). The Romans, however, won the
battle and, in the counterattack, a combined force of Romans and Goths killed
150 Persians (2.18.25). In the Battle of the Phasis River we learn that most of
a Persian advance force of 1,000 men was killed, while some were taken captive
(2.30.39). This left 4,000 Persian men in the marching camp of the initial
5,000-strong expeditionary force, and by the end we learn that a significant
number of Persians were killed in the dawn raid (2.30.45).
Procopius tells us at the end of the Battle of Dara that a Roman victory
was something that had not happened for a long time (Wars 1.14.54), which
shows that his approach echoes Thucydides’ when it comes to the prevalence
of uneven numbers reflecting the perceived gravity of a battle. As a point of
comparison, in a battle where the Athenians suffered significant losses near
Spartalus, Thucydides reports the number of Athenian casualties, but not the
number of Chalcidian or Bottiaian casualties.26 Conversely, in the battles of
Callinicum and Anglon, the Romans were defeated. Although Procopius has
not misled us on the two defeats, he appears reluctant to discuss the number of
Romans killed, in spite of the fact that there were heavy losses on both sides
in these Persian Pyrrhic victories. In the Battle of Nisibis the Romans were
victorious and, as the battle was not described in as much detail as the Battle
of Dara, he provided much less information, which included leaving out the
number of Romans killed. In the heat of battle it would have been difficult for
Procopius to keep track of the numbers lost on the Roman side, let alone the
Persian side, unless an official tally of Roman casualties was made.
Besides underlining the battles themselves, Procopius seeks to emphasize the
heroics of Belisarius in many of these battles, for it was his actions that rescued
the Romans from certain defeat. Had Belisarius not stepped in and snatched
25 Despite the defeat, however, it turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Persians. In fact,
the difference in the relative importance of the two major battles of the Persian Wars, the Battle
of Dara, a Roman victory, and the Battle of Callinicum, a Roman defeat, is probably exaggerated;
although the Romans won the former battle, the Persians immediately followed it up with yet
another invasion, while in the latter battle, even though the Romans were defeated, the Persians
suffered heavy losses, which had a major impact on their ability to continue the war. For a detailed
discussion of this battle and its outcome, see Greatrex 1998: 195–212.
26 Thuc. 2.79.2.
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victory from defeat, that total of fifty Romans killed at Nisibis would have been
significantly higher. Furthermore, this figure is substantially lower than the
number of Persian casualties reported only a few lines later.27 If we look back
at the Battle of Dara, we find that Procopius is trying to emphasize this victory,
a crucial moment in the narrative and something unique in his eyes in contem-
porary Roman history. Undoubtedly there were losses on the Roman side, but
the Romans had followed Belisarius’ instructions and, as a result, had defeated
the Persians against what seemed like incredible odds. By contrast, Belisarius
had lost the Battle of Callinicum, and the best way to minimize the impact was
to underscore the magnitude of the casualties suffered by the victorious Persians
and to downplay Roman losses, as was the practice of Herodotus and Thucy-
dides.
Before we turn to the Vandal Wars, there remains one last point to make.
Overall, Procopius’ combat figures in the Persian Wars, not to mention the
Vandal Wars and Gothic Wars, as we will see, are reliable, and generally free of
fabrication. This is what we should expect, given that in the preface to the Wars
he emphasized the importance of truth, and argued that everything and everyone
would be described as accurately as possible (Procop. Wars 1.1.4–6). Although
we cannot always compare Procopius’ figures in his combat descriptions with
other sources to see whether he did aim for truthfulness, there are exceptions,
particularly when it comes to the battles described in the Persian Wars. There
we find instances where we can compare Procopius’ figures with those used by
other contemporary or near-contemporary historians. For example, Procopius,
Malalas, and Pseudo-Zachariah all describe the Battle of Callinicum in some
detail, and while they might agree on some points, they disagree on others. Both
Procopius and Malalas include figures, and the totals Malalas and Procopius
provide for the Romans are comparable: Procopius assigns the Romans around
20,000 men,28 and the Persians 15,000;29 Malalas gives Belisarius a force of
8,000 men, Arethas 4,000 men, Sunicas 5,000 men, and Stephanus, Apscal,
and Simmas 4,000 men (21,000 total).30 Malalas excludes the Persian numbers,
while Pseudo-Zachariah does not mention any figures, Roman or Persian. If
we assume that Malalas was using official documents, whatever they might have
been,31 and that his figures are therefore accurate, this would give some weight
to Procopius’ figures: Procopius’ total for the Roman army (20,000) is similar to
Malalas’ (21,000). On the other hand, his figure falls short of Malalas’, which in
turn suggests some rounding, even if it is minimal in nature. This discrepancy
27 It is worth pointing out that casualty figures in a battle could vary widely between two sides,
with the side that turns in flight most likely to suffer heavy casualty figures. Note Procopius’
comments at 4.17.14–15.
28 Procop. Wars 1.18.5.
29 Procop. Wars 1.18.1.
30 Malalas 18.60.
31 On the sources used by Malalas and Procopius, see Greatrex 1998: 194–195.
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is unlikely the result of wilful intent on Procopius’ part, however; historians in
classical antiquity used rounding just as in the present we sometimes do. In a
paper on Herodotus, Rubincam noted the modern tendency to avoid specifics
in our conversations.32 We might use phrases such as “I have to mark 170
essays,” rather than, “I have to mark 172 essays.” It seems that Herodotus and
his contemporaries also had a high tolerance for such estimates.33
the VANDAL WARS
I now turn to the Vandal Wars, and my focus will remain on the numbers
included in descriptions of combat, though I will occasionally look at the figures
used in the larger campaigns. We will find that the numbers tend to be less
precise here than those in the Persian Wars, and that they serve roles in the
narrative beyond their function as pieces of data.
The first set of figures that has some bearing on combat comes near the
beginning, and it is the numbers given for the size of Roman expeditionary
armies, from Basiliscus’ 100,000 strong force in 468 (Procop. Wars 3.6.1) to
Belisarius’ force that included 10,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry (3.11.2), not to
mention 30,000 sailors (3.11.14), in 533. Shifting to combat, there is a skirmish
at the beginning of the Battle of Ad Decimum, and, in the mélée, Procopius
tells us that John killed twelve of Ammatas’ men (3.18.6). After Ammatas’
defeat we learn the following about the Vandals: “For they were travelling in
no order and were not arranged for battle, but in squadrons, and these were
small; for they marched in [squadrons of] 20 or 30” (3.18.8).34 At 3.18.12 we
learn that 2,000 came with Gibamundus to Pedion Halon. Some lines later
Procopius tells us that “there was a certain man among the Massagetae . . . who
led a few men” (3.18.13).35 Following the skirmish between the Massagetae and
the Vandals, Procopius simply states that “they were all disgracefully destroyed”
(Äpantew a’sxr™w diefy‡rhsan, 3.18.19) without telling us how many sol-
diers were present. Instead, we learn only that Belisarius gave his exhortation
to “the whole army” (§pan . . . t˜ str‡teuma, 3.19.1). Following the exhor-
tation, numbers continue to be absent, replaced by descriptors such as “all the
horsemen” (t™n ´ppvn Æp‡ntvn, 3.19.11), “the whole army” (t! pant“ . . .
strat!, 3.19.12), “the rest of the army” (t! Äll™ strat!, 3.19.13), and “a
great many Vandal horsemen” (Band’lvn ´ppvn p‡mpolu, 3.19.15). In the
only instance in this episode where Procopius gives a figure, we read: “Uliaris
the bodyguard of Belisarius happened to be there with 800 guards” (O[l’arin
t˜n Belisar’ou doruf—ron jn ¿paspista”w ¥ktakos’oiw tetœxhken eånai,
3.19.23). Then, at the end of the battle, and in regard to casualties, specific
32 Rubincam 2008: 99–100.
33 Rubincam 2008: 100.
34 \poreœonto gˆr o[den“ k—sm™ o[d qw \w m‡xhn juntetagmnoi, úllˆ katˆ summor’aw, ka“
taœtaw braxe’aw: katˆ tri‡konta gˆr Ö eækosin ¾esan.
35 Ôn d tiw \n to”w Massagtaiw ún|r . . . ¥l’gvn d =goœmenow úndr™n.
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Procop. Relevant Text in Passage
Wars
4.1.12 “the whole army”
4.2.1 “After such words of exhortation Belisarius sent all the horsemen,
except [pl|n] for 500”
4.2. “with the infantry and the 500 horsemen”
4.3.4 “Martinus and Valerian and John and Cyprian and Althias and Mar-
cellus held the left flank and as many others [Ðsoi Älloi] who were
leading the foederati”
4.3.4 “and the right by Pappas and Barbatus and Aigan and as many [Ðsoi]
led the cavalry units”
4.3.6 500 horsemen with Belisarius
4.3.7 “with the rest of the army”
4.3.10 “John selected a few of those under him”
4.3.12 “John again led out more [ple’ouw] of Belisarius’ guardsmen”
4.3.12 “with almost all [p‰si sxed˜n] of Belisarius’ guards and spearmen”
4.3.15 “then the whole Roman army”
4.3.18 “fewer than [³ssouw Ö] 50 of the Romans died in this battle, but
of the Vandals about [m‡lista] 800”
Table 1
numbers are again omitted, for Procopius simply states that they “lost many
there” (pollow \ntaāya úpobal—ntew, 3.19.31).
The first reference to the size of the army comes in the Battle of Tricamarum,
one of the most detailed accounts of combat in the Vandal Wars, and throughout
Procopius offers a range of different figures (Table 1). In his description of the
confusion that follows the battle, and after the brief interlude when he supplies
us with seemingly definite figures for casualties, Procopius again uses vague
descriptors when he describes the action, before finishing with something more
definite. So we get “some few domestics” (t™n oket™n ¥l’goi tinw, 4.3.21),
and “killing all men upon whom they happened” (Ändraw mn Ðsoiw \ntœxoien
Ákteinon, 4.3.24). The emerging pattern is that Procopius shies away from
referring to the size of both Roman and Vandal forces involved in combat in
the Vandal Wars, which is very much in keeping with the larger narrative. Too
much attention to the precise figures would detract from his efforts to craft a
dramatic, surprising, and brilliant victory in this contest, at least if the number of
participants—the size of the respective Roman and Vandal armies—was similar.
This might well explain the absence of numbers for the size of the participating
forces. With that said, what we find is that Procopius does not exaggerate, and
that his selectivity is best understood in terms of his literary intentions.
Though not a complete list, the compilation in Table 2 gives some indication
of the sorts of figures Procopius uses in descriptions of combat elsewhere in the
Vandal Wars. Overall, he is less inclined to use definite figures in the Vandal
Wars in comparison to the Persian Wars. In the Battle of Dara, as we saw,
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Procop. Battle Relevant Text in Passage
Wars
4.11.14 Mammes Solomon decides to lead his “whole army” against the
Berbers after he reads a letter
4.11.23 Mammes “around 50,000 [katˆ muri‡daw pnte] Berbers have
gathered and already defeated 500 Romans”
4.11.51 Mammes “no fewer than [o[x Çsson Ö] 500”
4.11.55 Mammes “it is said that 10,000 Berbers died in this struggle”
4.12.2 Mt Bourgaon Solomon marches off with his whole army against the
Berbers
4.12.17 Mt Bourgaon Solomon’s orders Theodorus to lead 1,000 foot soldiers
4.12.25 Mt Bourgaon “50,000 Berbers died in this encounter”
4.12.25 Mt Bourgaon “but not one of the Romans” (died in this encounter)
4.15.9 Mt Aurasium Belisarius “chose 100 of his spearmen and guards”
4.15.11 Mt Aurasium “Belisarius gathered about [úmf“] 2,000 of his army”
4.15.46 Mt Aurasium “the army being much too small” (l’an toā strateœ-
matow braxow »ntow)
4.17.2 Scalae Veteres Germanus arrives with his whole army
4.17.4 Scalae Veteres Germanus then lines up his army and places all the
infantry along the wagons
4.17.5 Scalae Veteres Germanus places the best of the horsemen on the left of
the infantry, and all the rest on the right flank
4.17.8 Scalae Veteres arrangement of the opposing forces including many myr-
iads (muri‡dew polla’) of Berbers
4.17.24 Scalae Veteres Stotzas managed to escape with a few men
4.17.26 Scalae Veteres Germanus sends some of his followers to attack one side
4.17.28 Scalae Veteres Germanus rushes in with all the rest of the army
4.17.31 Scalae Veteres Many of the Berbers pursue the mutineers
4.17.33 Scalae Veteres Stotzas flees with 100 men
Table 2
there was a wide variety of different figures. Procopius tells us how many
troops the Romans and Persians had at Dara,36 the number of reinforcements
brought by the Persians,37 and, on two separate occasions, the number of troops
under specific Roman or allied commanders.38 He also provides specific casualty
figures.39 In what is arguably the centrepiece battle of the Vandal Wars, the
Battle of Ad Decimum, Procopius is less clear about the numbers involved.
We might assume that the total size of the Roman force participating in the
battle equalled the total given at the beginning of the narrative,40 and phrases
36 Procop. Wars 1.13.23.
37 Procop. Wars 1.14.1.
38 Procop. Wars 1.3.19, 1.3.20.
39 Procop. Wars 1.14.41, 1.14.51.
40 Procop. Wars 3.11.1.
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like “the whole army” and “all the horsemen/cavalry” suggest as much. This
latter battle took place four years after the original invasion and we have no
way of knowing what happened to the many soldiers and units involved after
Belisarius’ initial conquest, at least based on Procopius’ narrative. Thus, it is
hard to reconstruct the numbers involved in the many battles from Procopius’
account.41 The seeming preponderance of figures for Romans over Vandals
might be due to lack of information: Procopius was ill-informed about the
Vandals. On the other hand, given the readiness with which he provided Persian
casualty figures, as we saw above (397), such an explanation is insufficient.
Comparing the numbers used in the Persian Wars with the numbers used in
the Vandal Wars, we find subtle differences. Most notably, the Vandal Wars is
rife with qualifiers such as “about.” Procopius’ sparse usage of definite figures
serves to highlight the accuracy of those he does use: the reader might believe
that if he did not know the figures involved, he would not use them.42 Thus,
through his lack of exaggeration and his use of qualifiers where needed, Pro-
copius demonstrates that his account can be trusted.43
Procopius, on occasion, juxtaposes figures that he claims are accurate with
figures that are nearly accurate. In the Battle of Mt Aurasium, for exam-
ple, we get “100 of his spearmen and guards” (t™n a¿toā doruf—rvn te ka“
¿paspist™n °kat˜n, Procop. Wars 4.15.9), “about [úmf“] 2,000 of his army”
(4.15.11), and “350 stades distant from Carthage” (pent}konta ka“ triakos’oiw
stad’oiw Karxhd—now dixousan, 4.15.12–13). The reader is likely to assume
that the middle figure is a definite number, regardless of the qualifier “about,”
because of its proximity to two other figures where no such qualifier is given.
Conversely, the inclusion of one qualifier, such as “about,” in a set of figures
in close succession persuades the reader that the two definite figures are accu-
rate, for if they were not, the reader would expect Procopius to have included
a qualifier as he did with the 2,000.44 Even when the qualifiers are used with
numbers that stand alone, they often have the same effect. So, when Procopius
makes statements such as “no fewer than [o[x Çsson Ö] 500” (4.11.51), “it
is said that 10,000 Berbers died in this struggle” (ka“ lgontai Maurous’vn
mœrioi \n toœt~ t! p—n~ úpoyane”n, 4.11.55), and “fewer than [³ssouw Ö]
50 of the Romans died in this battle, but of the Vandals about [m‡lista] 800”
(4.3.18), readers are more likely to believe his figures because of his use of the
qualifier. This acceptance, however, is conditional on the use of precise figures
at other points in the text. If the text were full of qualifiers, though short of
precision, Procopius’ authority would be undermined. In other words, Procopius
41 See Treadgold 1995: 60; 2007: 219–220.
42 See Hornblower 1994: 150–152 on Thucydides and numbers.
43 See Marincola 1997; Dewald 2007.
44 For example, Procop. Wars 4.11.23: “around [katˆ] 50,000 Berbers have gathered and already
defeated 500 Romans.”
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uses precise figures regularly and qualifiers infrequently, which suggests that he
strove to provide the most accurate data possible.
Procopius’ numbers in the Vandal Wars serve a number of purposes. He is
much less precise than he is in the Persian Wars, a feature which helps him to
highlight the events that he describes while not drawing the readers’ attention
to the two forces, Roman and Vandal, that were likely similar in size, which
would have served to undermine the perceived magnitude of the Roman victory.
In addition, his extended use of qualifiers and selective use of precise figures,
often juxtaposed, emphasized the authority, and trustworthiness, of Procopius
the historian and narrator. His use of qualifiers may point to the difficulties
he had in getting accurate numbers, at least for the Vandals, and might also
explain the few figures in the “myriad” range that he used for the Berbers as well
(4.11.55, 4.12.25).45 Indeed, at the end of this section it is worth remembering
that Procopius stressed Belisarius’ concern over the Romans’ lack of information
about the Vandals (3.14.1), which was in marked contrast to the situation in
the east, for they had long established means of getting good information about
their Persian foes.46
precision in the GOTHIC WARS
One aspect of Procopius’ use of numbers in the Gothic Wars that has at-
tracted the attention of scholars such as Hannestad, Thompson, and Cameron
is Procopius’ precision.47 These scholars have posited a change in Procopius’
presentation of numbers in the second half of the Gothic Wars, suggesting that
the numbers became much more precise. They have also argued that Procopius
tended to exaggerate the number of enemy (especially Gothic) forces, particu-
larly at the onset of the war; and, that he inflated these Gothic numbers for the
sake of glorifying Belisarius.48
Accuracy and precision are not synonymous, though they are related. Where
a reported figure of 1,000 for a troop total may be said to be accurate if there
really were, in any historical sense, 1,000 troops involved in the situation in
question, the expression of “1,000 troops” is more precise than “no fewer than
1,000 troops,” regardless of how accurate the 1,000 figure is, because the former
is exact, while the latter is not. In the Wars the numbers used for people, whether
troops or casualties, tend to be round figures. In the Gothic Wars, as with the
45 For a thorough discussion of the peculiarities of the Berbers in their conflict with the Romans,
see Modéran 2003: 607–633.
46 See Lee 1993: 109–128; Nechaeva 2014. Cf. Börm 2007: 52–69.
47 Hannestad 1960; Thompson 1982: 77–91; Cameron 1985: 147–150. Liebeschuetz (1996:
232), like Thompson and Cameron, agrees with Hannestad and argues that Procopius’ numbers are
incomplete and unreliable.
48 Evans (1972: 74, 143, n. 82) was one of the first to raise doubts about this second conclusion.
Note too that Procopius claimed in the preface that he would provide a balanced account of leading
figures (Procop. Wars 1.1.4).
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rest of the text, numbers for troops are given in multiples of ten.49 As a result
we find phrases such as: “having selected 300 men from an infantry division”
(Procop. Wars 5.14.1); “no fewer than 1,000 Goths fell” (5.18.14); “he sent 600
horsemen” (6.2.9); “around 2,000 men from the Herulian nation followed him”
(6.13.18); and “no more than 1,000 men following him” (7.1.27).50 Procopius
also uses qualifiers like “about,” “around,” “no more than,” and “no less than.”
Generally, when numbers are reported, they are not always precise, particularly
with respect to troop totals, whether it is for casualties, or units assigned a
particular task.
What is probably the best marker of precision is the presence, or absence,
of expressions such as “about,” “around,” “more than,” “no more than,” “fewer
than,” and “no fewer than.” The evidence from the table in the appendix (see
below, 409–411) shows that these terms are fairly evenly distributed throughout
Books 5 through 7. There are thirty figures from the list that are from Book
5, thirty-three from Book 6, and fifty-two from Book 7. Of those, in Book 5
Procopius uses an imprecise phrase like “around” 27% of the time; in Book 6 he
uses such a phrase 30% of the time; and in Book 7, 23% of the time. Based on
this criterion, Procopius seems to get less precise as the narrative moves towards
the centre of the Gothic Wars, and then more precise as it heads into Book 7,
which has a much greater total number of figures. It is worth stressing that
the differences in percentages are slight, however. Book 7 also has many more
pages than the previous two books: 185 in the Teubner edition. As a point of
comparison, Book 5 takes up 142 Teubner pages, and Book 6, 143 pages. If
we stay with the division into halves that Hannestad originally advocated, and
so divide those page totals into two sections, the mid-point of the Gothic Wars
comes at 6.26. The new tallies are sixty figures for the first half, with the use
of an imprecise qualifier 28% of the time; and, fifty-five figures for the second
half, with the use of an imprecise qualifier 24% of the time. Hannestad and
the others are vindicated, but only by the slimmest of margins, though again it
should be pointed out that the siege of Rome, which is the longest description,
falls in the first half. The conclusions of those previous scholars, then, need
modification. Rather, Procopius is slightly more precise in the second half of
the Gothic Wars, though he also uses slightly fewer figures.
Another criterion for measuring precision is the number of times adjectives
are used instead of specific figures, keeping in mind that an adjective is certainly
vaguer than a number. A typical example is found at 5.7.1, where Procopius
writes: “the Goths, who were being led by Asinaris and Gripas among others,
had come to Dalmatia with a great army [strat! poll!].” Instances where
49 The abundance of multiples of ten might in part be due to the size of the unit in Procopius’
day, at least for Roman soldiers. See Treadgold 2005: 14.
50 5.14.1: úpolxaw o{n Ändraw \k katal—gou pezikoā triakos’ouw; 5.18.14: \n toœt~ t!
p—n~ p’ptousi mn G—tyoi o[x ³ssouw É x’lioi; 6.2.9: ´ppaw °jakos’ouw . . . Ástellen; 6.13.18:
eæponto d o´ ka“ toā &Epoœlvn Áynouw disx’lioi m‡lista; 7.1.27: o[ plon É x’lioi a[t! eæponto.
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Procopius describes an army or division in this manner in the Gothic Wars
abound; the same holds true for when he describes the number of casualties
following an engagement. So, at 6.23.35 we read: “the soldiers, while looking
down on the enemy in the field, went against them on the run, so killing some
of them [tin‡w te a[t™n] in the first rush.”51 What is important, however,
is their distribution; if one accepts the conclusions reached by Hannestad and
others about the increase in precision in the second half of the text, with the
low mark being around the siege of Rome, then one should expect to find more
general descriptors in the first half of the Gothic Wars. A close examination
reveals, however, that this is not the case.
The table in the appendix (below, 409–411) includes all of those instances
where Procopius uses adjectives instead of specific figures when discussing a
troop contingent, whether he is referring to its size or its casualty totals. As
one would expect given the lengths of Books 5 and 6, the total number of
adjectives used in these instances is roughly the same. The number of places
where adjectives are used in Book 7 is greater, which is unsurprising given that
the seventh book is longer than the previous two. With that said, Book 7 is
only about 30% longer than Book 5, and about 31% longer than Book 6, while
adjectives are used 65% more often in Book 7 than Book 5, and 60% more
often than Book 6. Turning from adjectives to numbers, if one divides the
Gothic Wars into halves, and then compares the totals, the results are striking,
at least in view of the theory that there is an increase in precision in the second
half: my tentative total for the first half includes 101 cases, while my total for
the second half contains 102 cases. At the end of these analyses for numbers
and for adjectives, then, there is no evidence that the second half of the text is
more precise than the first.
conclusion
On the basis of this analysis of combat figures in the Persian Wars and Vandal
Wars, Rubincam’s observations on the use of numbers by classical historians,
from their presentation of uneven casualty figures to the use of qualifiers in
cases of doubtful information, hold true for Procopius, who appears to adopt
the practices employed by classical historians such as Thucydides. In the second
half of this paper, contrary to some earlier research, Procopius is shown to have
been more consistent in his use of figures in the Gothic Wars than he is usually
given credit for.
Although this essay on Procopius’ use of numbers reveals that he manipulated
his material a great deal, he did so in order to pursue literary ends,52 which
51 o´ d strati™tai úmf“ t|n p—an katid—ntew tow polem’ouw, dr—m~ \p' a[tow ®esan, tin‡w
te a[t™n \n t_ prQt+ `dm_ Ákteinon.
52 On the importance of careful arrangement in ancient history, see Lucian Hist. Conscr. 39–44.
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could include, for instance, a desire to improve readability, as in the case of
his description of the Battle of Callinicum. The manipulation should not be
taken to mean that he fabricated his materials. Rather, Procopius was being
selective, as was his prerogative, and in that respect, as in so many others, he
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appendix: numbers used in the GOTHIC WARS
Procop. Side Numbers reported
Wars
5.5.2 Roman 4,000 foederati, around 3,000 Isaurians
5.5.4 Roman 200 allied Huns, 300 Moors
5.6.2 Gothic 3,000 Gothic warlike men
5.7.34 Roman 500 men from the army
5.10.1 Roman Selecting around 400 men
5.10.3 Roman The 400 men
5.10.8 Roman 200 of the men around him
5.10.37 Gothic No fewer than 800 Goths were captured
5.11.26 Gothic No fewer than 4,000 men
5.12.51 Gothic Around 2,000 soldiers
5.14.1 Roman 300 men from an infantry division
5.16.11 Gothic Cavalry and infantry numbering no fewer than
150,000
5.17.17 Gothic 22 deserters came to them, barbarian by nation, but
Roman soldiers
5.17.17 Roman 1,000 horsemen
5.18.14 Gothic no fewer than 1,000 Goths
5.22.17 Roman amounted to about 5,000
5.23.26 Gothic 30,000 of the Goths
5.24.2 Roman, Gothic although the army has been reduced to 5,000 men.
But the enemy, having gathered 150,000 men
5. 26.19 Roman 1,600 military horsemen
5.27.6 Roman with the 200 men
5.27.11 Gothic no fewer than 1,000 Goths
5.27.11 Roman with 300 guardsmen
5.27.13 Roman with 300 horsemen
5.27.16 Gothic 500 horsemen
5.27.18 Roman selected 1,000 men
5.27.22 Roman 1,500 troops
5.29.44 Roman hacked to pieces, fell there, along with 42 infantrymen
6.2.9 Roman 600 horsemen
6.3.7 Gothic no fewer than around 7,000 men
6.4.6 Roman With 1,000 men
6.4.7 Roman with around 500 men
6.4.19 Roman no fewer than 500 soldiers
6.5.1 Roman with around 3,000 Isaurians . . . and 800 horsemen
. . . and with them 1,000 other soldiers from a
division of horsemen
6.5.2 Roman with 300 horsemen arrived . . . they were mixed with
500 men who had been collected
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(continued)
Procop. Side Numbers reported
Wars
6.7.3 Roman with 100 horsemen
6.10.1 Roman with 2,000 horsemen
6.11.1 Gothic 1,000 men . . . and such a number
6.11.2 Gothic 500 men in the garrison of . . . he left behind 4,000
Goths . . . 2,000 men in the city of
6.11.3 Gothic no fewer than 500 men
6.11.4 Roman with 1,000 horsemen
6.11.22 Roman with the 400
6.12.26 Roman 1,000 Isaurians and Thracians
6.12.40 Roman with around 300 men
6.13.17 Roman 5,000 soldiers followed with him
6.13.18 Roman around 2,000 men from the Herulian nation
6.16.18 Roman there with 1,000 men
6.18.6 Roman Heruls and spearmen and his guards . . . along with
those with . . . and the followers of . . . he asserted
were no fewer than 10,000 men
6.20.21 General populace no fewer than 50,000 people
6.21.39 General populace totalling no fewer than 300,000
6.23.2 Roman along with 500 foot-soldiers from a division
6.23.5 Roman with 11,000 men
6.25.2 Frankish 100,000 men
6.27.16 Roman 7 Armenian men who were deployed
6.28.10 German/Frankish our army of no fewer than 500,000 warlike men
6.28.31 Gothic 4,000 Ligurians and men from the fortresses in the
Alps
7.1.27 Gothic no more than 1,000 men following him
7.3.4 Roman army of Romans numbering 12,000 was gathered
7.4.12 Gothic, Roman for going from 200,000 men to 5,000 . . . the number
that you happened to live with was no more than
1,000
7.4.19 Gothic 300 of his followers
7.10.3 Roman having collected 4,000 men
7.10.11 Roman 170
7.11.19 Roman 3 of his spearmen . . . with 1,000 men
7.11.28 Gothic 2,000 men
7.11.30 Gothic 200 of them
7.15.3 Roman with 500 men
7.18.29 Gothic they were 300
7.19.19 Gothic all of the Goths, who numbered around 200
7.19.25 Roman 100 horsemen
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(continued)
Procop. Side Numbers reported
Wars
7.20.19 General populace 500 men
7.20.23 General populace,
Roman
26 of the soldiers died, as well as 60 members of the
public
7.21.4 Gothic, Roman earlier we had collected 200,000 of the most warlike
soldiers . . . we were defeated at the hands of 7,000
Greek men
7.21.5 Roman more than 20,000 men from the enemy
7.22.3 Roman 300 Antae
7.22.21 Roman the 300 Antae
7.23.7 Roman he came with an army . . . with the 15 soldiers
7.23.8 Roman 1,000 of the soldiers
7.23.18 Gothic a garrison that numbered no fewer than 400 men
7.26.6 Gothic the army . . . and these same 400 barbarians
7.26.10 Gothic no fewer than 70 Roman soldiers
7.26.16 Roman with those under him numbered 1,000
7.27.3 Roman 300 Heruls . . . with 800 Armenians . . . and guards
who numbered no more than 1,000
7.27.9 Roman more than 200
7.27.15 Roman 300 of his followers
7.27.16 Roman gathered 900 valorous men, 700 horsemen, 200
foot-soldiers
7.28.10 Gothic more than 200
7.28.13 Gothic 3,000 horsemen from his entire expeditionary force
7.29.3 Roman? commanders of the Illyrians having an army of
15,000
7.30.1 Roman no fewer than 2,000 foot-soldiers
7.30.6 Roman army of the Romans was 300 Illyrian horsemen . . .
100 foot-soldiers
7.30.18 Roman 2,000 horsemen from the expeditionary force
7.30.23 Roman 80 men from the army of Romans
7.34.40 Roman (sent to
Lombards)
more than 10,000 horsemen
7.34.42 Roman 1,500 allied Heruls followed them
